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 Classical welfare economics assumes that the demand function, or 
consumers’ utility, is known with certainty. Probabilistic microeconomics 
generalizes it by maximizing expected utility, or by optimizing under a 
specific constraint. Existing research has provided only limited insight into 
the welfare effects of demand uncertainty, and that limited insight suggests 
welfare reduction as a result of demand uncertainty. In contrast with previous 
works, our paper does not prescribe the form of demand uncertainty, but 
rather derive it from individual consumers’ choices. We then analyze 
monopolist optimization problem, first constrained by a “Safety-First” type 
condition imposed on the coefficient of variation, and then by considering 
risk-adjusted profit measure.  Our results indicate that the Marshallian 
welfare measure, when compared with the deterministic model, increases 
with uncertainty of the demand function. 
We point out that uncertainty characterizes markets that lie between the pure 
monopoly model, and perfect competition model. We believe that our model 
of demand uncertainty is a realistic one, very much like observed behavior of 
markets. Most importantly, our work suggests that transition from 
monopolistic market structure to competitive one may be explained better by 
demand uncertainty than by mere presence of competitors, as opposed to the 
instant appearance of competitive pricing in common textbook models. 
Finally, we show how a demand can be efficiently estimated from simple 
consumer surveys (admitting its random structure).  
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Introduction 
 Neither a pure monopoly nor a pure competition is a realistic 
description of markets for goods and services, which we observe in real life. 
One possible alternative to those two is the monopolistic competition, in 
which each producer holds a monopoly for a product, with those products 
being close substitutes. This phenomenon is indeed more common in the real 
world than in economics textbooks: consumers hardly ever face a choice 
between two (or more) identical products or services. Even two gas stations 
selling gasoline across the street from each other differentiate their products 
with brand names, additional services, or ethanol content. 
 Things in the real world are even more complicated. In reality, a 
consumer does not decide to make a purchase of a good or service in a 
purely deterministic fashion, but rather each individual purchase decision is 
quite uncertain, and affected by numerous factors, such as preferences of the 
consumer, the price, current mood or confidence of the consumer, 
availability of substitutes, etc. If the purchase decision were indeed fully 
determined by the purchase price, as the standard deterministic models 
suggest, then massive advertising campaigns developed by businesses would 
appear quite impractical. In reality, advertising, as well as sales, coupons, 
etc., work, as they all may affect the consumer in the moment of the 
purchase decision. They are only in the limited degree functioning as the 
source of information about price and quantity, and to a much larger extent 
they seek to affect the momentary lapse of judgment, or momentary depth of 
it, at the moment of purchase. 
 For the two idealized market models present in economics textbooks, 
monopoly and perfect competition, the above argument does not apply. In 
the pure monopoly model, the consumer faces a price given by the 
monopolist, and other factors are generally fully set by the aggregate market 
structure. The purchase decision is basically determined by the price. 
Paradoxically, perfect competition produces a similar “no uncertainty” 
outcome, as the price is effectively set by the relationship of the industry cost 
structure and the industry demand, and again each individual consumer’s 
purchase decision is basically determined by the price.  
 It is the “grey area” of markets between perfect competition and pure 
monopoly that result in greatest uncertainty of the consumers’ purchase 
decisions. Consumers can always change their minds and go to another 
seller, even if the price is higher there, because of receiving a slightly 
differentiated product that they are happier with, or just not feeling like 
buying now, but getting that magic shopping feeling later. They may be 
affected by advertising, reputation, promotions, etc.  
 Because of their welfare implications, monopolistic markets are 
generally perceived as socially undesirable, while perfectly competitive 
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markets are viewed as socially desirable. Realistic markets seem to be 
viewed as a messy “in-between” case. But even this perception begs a 
question: are realistic markets in equilibrium of their own, or do they evolve 
over time towards one of the two purely theoretical concepts? In this work, 
we create a model that seems to indicate that realistic models naturally 
converge towards competitive model as a result of uncertainty, and that 
uncertainty of demand may in fact result in increased welfare. 
 
Modeling uncertainty of demand 
 Classical welfare economics is developed under the assumption of 
complete knowledge of the demand function. In reality, producers face great 
uncertainty in assessing consumers’ demand, even in a monopolistic or 
perfectly competitive market. The aggregate demand is downward sloping 
both in the case of monopolistic and competitive markets, and in the real 
business world, the actual demand is subject to both measurement 
uncertainty, and the uncertainty of the underlying functional relationship. 
The effects of randomness of demand has been studied, generally, with the 
objective of expected utility maximization, or under a “Safety-First” 
constraint, with some theoretically prescribed random structure of demand. 
Our work proposes what we believe to be a more practical alternative. 
 McCall (1971) provided an early survey of probabilistic 
microeconomics. He stated: “work is underway in reformulating the theory 
of the firm under conditions of uncertainty, in assessing the role of 
information in general equilibrium theory, in integrating uncertainty with 
welfare economics, and in designing measures of uncertainty possessing both 
theoretical appeal and practical importance.”  While the use of expected 
utility maximization is most common, Hanoch and Levy (1969) provided 
examples of an situations with lower expected value and higher variance 
having higher expected utility, suggesting that maximization of expected 
utility may produce counterintuitive results. Brown G., Jr. & Johnson, M.B. 
(1969), and in a comment to their work, Visscher, M. L. (1973), discussed 
the effect of demand uncertainty in a limited case of linear demand, with 
their results indicating that uncertainty of demand may result in welfare 
improvement. In contrast to that work, Leland (1972) used the expected 
utility models to study the output (and by implication, welfare) effect of 
uncertainty on a monopolist facing a random demand. In particular, all of 
Leland’s results indicate that uncertainty cause reduction in monopolist’s 
output. Leland (1972) nevertheless concluded that welfare effects of models 
studied by him remain unclear. Dana (1999) analyzed firms facing uncertain 
demand under constraints of costly capacity and prices set in advance, and 
concluded that such firms will sell their output at multiple prices, i.e., will 
utilize price discrimination. Equilibrium price dispersion with homogeneous 
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goods was first described by Prescott (1975) and developed more formally 
by Eden (1990). Unlike the approaches of Dana (1999), Prescott (1975) and 
Eden (1990), our model precludes price discrimination and assumes uniform 
pricing. We also do not prescribe stochastic demand structure, but rather 
derive it from consumers’ preferences. Also, in contrast to the results of Day, 
Aigner and Smith (1971), our model suggests that demand uncertainty will 
not produce safety margins in pricing, but rather lead to lower prices. 
 Roy (1952) provided an investment perspective on an alternative 
optimization approach, where the maximization of profit, or utility of profit, 
is constrained by the condition that the losses cannot exceed certain level 
with prescribed probability. This approach has been given a general name of 
Safety-First.  Haim and Sarnat (1972) point out that Roy’s Safety-First 
methodology can be reduced to the expected utility approach. Day, Aigner 
and Smith (1971) review Safety-First, in the form of three rules for a profit-
maximizing monopolist. They find that under Strict Safety-First, where the 
risk condition is binding for optimization, output exceeds the output under 
the other two, softer forms of Safety-First. Day, Morley and Smith (1974) 
argue that a model in which the company’s financial position affects its 
investment opportunities may provide an explanation as to why risk 
constraints are important in a monopolist’s pricing decision. 
 We believe that our approach provides an alternative to the above 
models. We propose that the random demand can be derived from individual 
consumers’ choices, and that the optimization can be either performed with 
respect to expected utility, or constrained by a binding condition on the 
coefficient of variation of demand (and, equivalently, of company’s profit). 
The resulting model shows that demand uncertainty actually expands output, 
thus providing potential for welfare enhancement. An additional bonus of 
our methodology is a new demand derivation procedure that can be used in 
practice for estimation of the demand function as well as of the marginal 
utility of the clients through simply designed consumer surveys.   
 
A new model 
 As the existing literature indicates, demand uncertainty can be 
modeled in many ways. We propose a new model for it. We assume that the 
firm is a monopolist facing random demand, i.e., for every price, the quantity 
demanded is a random variable  with  denoted by  and 
denoted by  Mathematically, this means that the demand 
function is a stochastic process  In our model, the demand is 
derived as a sum of individual Bernoulli Trials: decisions about purchase. 
Each purchase decision can be viewed as a comparison of the externally 
given price with individual’s preference for the item purchased, or as a utility 
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comparison. In a standard additive utility model, if one alternative is a 
numeraire good and the utility of the other alternative, a good or service 
purchased, is  where q is the quantity, the purchase decision is made if 
marginal utility  exceeds the price of additional item purchased. This 
decision is equivalent to comparing the reservation price, a random variable 
in our model, to the market price p. We propose that either the marginal 
utility or the reservation price can, and should be, treated as a random 
variable, to properly account for the uncertainty of each purchase by an 
individual consumer. This uncertainty has been only marginally 
acknowledged in theoretical economic literature, while it is overwhelmingly 
acknowledged by the massive advertisement expenditures of businesses, 
which perceive consumers’ preferences as uncertain and, most importantly, 
changeable. 
 Consider a firm that has N potential customers in a certain region. If 
this firm lowers its price, not only will more consumers from its region 
purchase the firm’s product, but also consumers from other regions may 
arrive. In our model, we will therefore assume that N is a decreasing function 
of p. Let us note that we do not assume that the N consumers all purchase the 
product, but rather that they all have some probability of purchasing it, i.e., 
are potential customers.  
 So let us assume that there are N(p) independent potential consumers 
in the market, and that each of them buys the product under consideration 
independently with probability  where  a function of p, 
with the following properties:   and  is strictly 
decreasing. This means effectively that each consumer’s purchase is an 
independent Bernoulli Trial (Fabian and Hannan, 1985). Under these 
assumptions, the total demand in time horizon T, given a price p, is a random 
variable  with a distribution described by: 
 
for  Then  is the expected 
value of the output, and its standard deviation is   
 
 
 The firm serving random demand cannot maximize profit without 
regard to uncertainty of the demand. One possible approach, most commonly 
used, is to decrease the expected profit by some measure of risk. Another 
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form of risk-adjustment is a “Safety-First”-type condition. We will begin 
with that second approach. 
 Safety-First Approach. The objective is to maximize expected profit 
while controlling risk, in a given time horizon T. The overall uncertainty may 
increase because of an increase in the number of potential customers as well 
as increased uncertainty of individual purchase. We will analyze risk per unit 
purchased. What is then a rational profit strategy? Assume for simplicity that 
there are no fixed costs, and the marginal cost is constant and equal to c. The 
strategy we propose is: 
     (1) 
 The quantity maximized can be also written as  The 
constraint states that standard deviation of price per quantity unit (i.e., 
coefficient of variation of demand or, equivalently, of profit) is bounded by a 
certain parameter  This is a form of a strict Safety–First condition, 
although it is somewhat different than the one used by Day, Aigner and 
Smith (1971). 
 We will now derive a more explicit formulation of the maximization 
problem (1). The expected profit, , is given by  
 
The optimization problem becomes: 
 
 Since the function  is strictly decreasing, the constraint can be 
also written as  
     (2) 
 Note that the inverse function  will also be strictly decreasing. To 
avoid a trivial situation, we assume also that c satisfies (2) (otherwise the set 
of admissible prices would be empty).  
 The producer’s optimization problem, as stated above, has some 
interesting properties. First, as the number of potential customers approaches 
infinity, the expression  approaches zero, and the constraint 
condition is naturally satisfied. Thus for larger potential markets, we can 
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expect the constraint (2) to be more easily met. Furthermore, since  and N 
are decreasing with p, reducing p will increase the firm’s chance of meeting 
the risk constraint (2), even if the optimal price is not known to the firm. On 
the other hand, if the optimal price without risk constraint is expected to be 
high, then (2) may not be satisfied at that high price level. This means that a 
product with a relatively high expected profit per unit (in relation to the size 
of the market), will be sold below the price that would be optimal in the 
absence of risk, if the risk constraint is imposed and is binding. 
 Risk-Adjusted Profit Approach. We will now present an alternative 
optimization approach. We propose a risk-adjusted profit measure, defined 
as: 
 
 Here,  is a coefficient of risk-aversion, and g is a measure of risk in 
demand uncertainty per unit of expected risk. We will assume that g is a 
differentiable and strictly increasing function on  For technical 
reasons we will also assume that  and  are differentiable functions. For 
example, if we measure the risk of profit by the standard deviation of the 
profit, then   
 
 Since  is decreasing and  is strictly decreasing in  we conclude 
that so defined g is strictly increasing. We assume also that  is such that 
 for some  (otherwise the risk adjusted profit could not be 
positive for any ). 
 The above models proposed here assume homogeneity of consumers. 
But our methodology can naturally be extended through aggregation of 
homogeneous submarkets to a heterogeneous market.    
 
Output and welfare implications for a Safety-First Model 
 Assume that the optimal price calculated in the absence of risk, 
without the risk controlling constraint (2), exists and denote it by  A key 
assertion of this section is 
If  then the optimal choice might be either the solution to 
the equation  denoted by  or a local maximum of 
 on the interval  In either case, risk considerations 
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by the producer result in a lower price and higher output to the consumer, 
thus expanding welfare. 
 
 The proof is elementary so we omit it. Consider an application of this 
model to a producer creating a new market through introduction of a new 
technology. Such a producers is generally a natural monopolist, yet faces 
great uncertainty of demand. Moreover, in this case, the potential market size 
N may be small, and, as a result, risk control condition may be difficult to 
satisfy. Our analysis indicates that utilization of risk management in their 
profit maximization may lead to lower prices and greater welfare. This 
model can provide an explanation for pricing strategies of Internet and 
technology startups, which, especially during the early internet shopping 
boom in the late 1990s offered deals that seemed too good to be true, but 
were true nevertheless, unfortunately also resulting in a subsequent bust of 
many of those firms. 
 Our model also provides an additional rationale for a different market 
design: a market created by dividing a monopolist into several smaller 
companies. Such “trust-busting” may expand welfare even if the resulting 
companies retain some degree of market power, as the resulting smaller 
companies will face greater uncertainty of demand. 
 
Risk-adjusted profit analysis and welfare implications 
 Let us denote by  the price such that it minimizes the profit , 
not adjusted for risk (this means that the profit is calculated deterministically, 
taking the expected value of demand as the deterministic demand). We will 
now state the key assertion of this section: 
 Assume that  has a unique local and global maximum at . 
Then the price for which the risk – adjusted profit measure  reaches 
maximum, is lower than the price  More specifically, for a certain range 
of prices, all less than  producer facing demand uncertainty enjoys 
higher expected risk-adjusted profit than for the previously optimal price 
 Moreover, increasing the price p above , provided  
always (not merely in a certain range of prices near ) decreases the 
expected risk-adjusted profit. 
 We will now prove this assertion. By assumption, there is  
(possibly ) such that  for all  If  the 
assertion trivially holds. So let us consider the case . Under the 
assumptions specified, the risk-adjusted profit is of the form  
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Its derivative is 
 
 As the maximum of non-risk-adjusted profit  at  is unique, 
local and global, for every  if  Hence the 
bigger the price (as long as it is above  and not bigger than ), the 
smaller the risk-adjusted profit. Furthermore, as  and 
 there is a price  such that  attains a global maximum at 
 with  
 The key conclusion of the above assertion is that if profit 
maximization is performed by considering a risk-adjusted profit measure, the 
result is lower prices to consumers and an increase in the Marshallian 
welfare measure. Furthermore, we should note that the standard comparison 
between a monopolistic and competitive market models gives competition as 
the reason that a producer must lower prices from the level of a profit-
maximizing monopoly price. Our model indicates that even a pure 
monopolist, when faced with the risk of demand uncertainty, is likely to 
respond with lower prices and sacrifice of some level of previously captured 
profits. Furthermore, demand uncertainty results in an increase of overall 
welfare, due to increase in output. One could therefore venture a hypothesis 
that demand uncertainty is the actual force behind a transition from a 
monopolistic market structure to a competitive one. This hypothesis is 
supported by so common among monopolists desire to lock-in their markets, 
to assure a customer base, as the resulting reduction in demand uncertainty 
benefits them at the expense of the consumers. 
 
Estimating the random demand 
 We will now present an efficient procedure for estimation of demand 
under our model. In order to estimate the function  consider a random 
sample  from a probability distribution defined by the condition 
 The random variable X is the consumer’s reservation 
price. In order to produce such a random sample in practice, we can collect 
data by asking the consumers the following question: 
 • What is the highest price you would be willing to pay for the said 
good (or service)? 
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 A simple estimator for  is then  where 
 is the indicator function. We have: 
(i)  with probability 1, (this follows from 
Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem, see Fabian and Hannan, 1985). 
(ii)  
(iii)  
It is also possible to replace the estimator with a smoothed version: 
 
where  is a differentiable increasing function of a real variable (called a 
kernel), and h is a smoothing parameter depending on n.  
 Note also that maximizing  subject to the constraint 
(2) (the Safety-First model case) splits into the following sub-problems: 
 First, estimate N taking into account the answers to the question A,  
for example: 
. (Total Population Size) 
Calculate  
Establish the function  
Find the argument  which maximizes  subject to 
the constraint  
The following convergences (almost surely, i.e., with probability 1) can be 
shown: 
  
under mild assumptions (see Fabian and Hannan, 1985). Similar results can 
be obtained for the case of risk adjusted profit measure.  
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 Let us note that the procedure provided here by us is a relatively 
simple one that can be performed with relatively small quantitative power. 
This stands in stark contrast with existing econometric approaches (e.g., 
Knittel and Metaxoglou, 2014, or Blundell, Horowitz, and Parey, 2013). In 
the following section, we illustrate this procedure with an empirical 
experiment, in which we derived an estimate of a demand function for a 
service of online courses preparing for professional actuarial examinations.  
 
Empirical experiment 
 In order to illustrate this methodology, we have performed an 
experiment aimed at estimating demand by students at Illinois State 
University for intensive review seminars preparing them for the first four 
actuarial examinations (professional examinations offered by the Society of 
Actuaries and the Casualty Actuarial Society in North America). Students 
were asked the question: “What would be the highest price you are willing to 
pay for a seminar?” separately for the first four actuarial examinations. 
While their responses were anonymous, they had to log in using their unique 
university ID, and therefore multiple entries from one person were 
prevented. 47 students participated. We were able to produce estimates for 
demands shown in the graphs below. The graphs give the probability of 
purchase for a given level of price, as estimated in the experiment. The 
students provided their responses in an online survey, with all appropriate 
procedures for working with human subjects secured, and with participants’ 
anonymity assured. 
 The graphs are what in probability theory would be called the 
survival function: For every number on the horizontal axis the value given is 
the probability of participants being willing to pay that price or higher. This 
gives us the function  This, in turn, allows us to create an 
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Figure 1: Estimate for the seminar for the first actuarial examination 
 
Figure 2: Estimate for the seminar for the second actuarial examination 
 
Figure 3: Estimate for the seminar for the third actuarial examination 
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 Our model indicates that a monopolist facing the risk of demand 
uncertainty will respond with lower prices and sacrifice some level of profits 
available in absence of such uncertainty. Furthermore, demand uncertainty 
results in an increase of overall welfare, due to increase in output. One could 
therefore venture a hypothesis that demand uncertainty is the actual force 
behind a transition from a monopolistic market structure to a competitive 
one. This hypothesis is supported by so common among monopolists desire 
to lock-in their markets, to assure a customer base, as the resulting reduction 
in demand uncertainty benefits them at the expense of the consumers.  On 
the other hand, a monopolist facing uncertain demand effectively moves 
towards behaving more as a firm existing in a competitive market. 
 Our model provides a rational explanation for lowering price as an 
optimal strategy for some firms facing uncertain demand. It can be argued 
that such has been the behavior of major US-based airlines, which do face 
great amount of uncertainty of demand, and often offer mysteriously low 
prices and make every attempt to fly full airplanes, while European carriers, 
historically facing more predictable demand, used to be often content with 
fewer passengers. Of course that historical structure of European air travel 
market has been dramatically changed with the strong entrance of low-fare 
carriers, such as Ryanair, causing increased uncertainty of demand and lower 
prices. Borenstein and Rose (1994) provide an insight into the uncertainty of 
demand in the U.S. airline industry, and model it via price discrimination, 
obtaining results consistent with our model: greater price uncertainty occurs 
on routes with more competition or lower flight density. 
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 Furthermore, we show that a random demand function can be derived 
from individual consumers’ purchase decisions, through simple consumer 
surveys. This survey methodology offers a simple and realistic methodology 
for immediate application of our approach in marketing approaches of 
businesses dealing with uncertainty of demand. 
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